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CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw-FEDERAL REGULATION OF LOBBYING Acr-VAcus 
AND INDEFINITE LANGUAGE As VIOLATION OF Fmsr AND FIFTH AMENDMENTS-
Defendants were charged with violation of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying 
Act1 because of failure to register as lobbyists under provisions of section 3082 
and to report expenditures as directed by section 305.3 The lower court found 
these sections of the statute unconstitutional and dismissed the information. 
On appeal, held, the act is not so vague and indefinite as to violate the due 
process clause of the Fifth Amendment; nor does it violate the First Amendment. 
The penalty provision of section 310(b)4 is not objectionable as a deprivation 
of First Amendment rights since it is separable.5 United States 17. Harriss, 347 
U.S. 612, 74 S.Ct. 808 (1954). 
160 Stat. L. 839, §§301-311 (1946), 2 U.S.C. (1952) §§261-270. 
2 Section 308(a): "Any person who shall engage himself for pay or for any considera-
tion for the purpose of attempting to influence the passage or defeat of any legislation by 
the Congress" is required to register listing his employer, amount of pay and his expense 
authorization. 
3 Section 305(a): ''Every person receiving any contributions or expending any money 
for the purposes designated in subparagraph (a) or (b) of section 307 shall file with the 
Clerk" a quarterly statement listing names of contributors of over $500 and of expenditures 
of over $10, the totals of those contributions and expenditures not listed by name, and the 
totals of the contributions received and of the expenditures made on a cumulative basis 
for the current year. 
4 Section 310(b) provides that the person convicted shall be prohibited for three years 
after conviction "from attempting to influence, directly or indirectly, the passage or defeat 
of any proposed legislation or from appearing before a committee of the Congress in support 
of or opposition to proposed legislation. . . ." 
5 In National Association of Manufacturers v. McGrath, (D.C. D.C. 1952) 103 F. 
Supp. 510 at 514, vacated as moot, 344 U.S. 804, 73 S.Ct. 31 (1952), this provision was 
found "obviously unconstitutional." The Court in the principal case refused to rule on the 
section as it had not been applied to the defendants. In any event, since there is a specific 
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"The clearest feature of the Court's decision is that it leaves the country 
under an Act which is not much like any Act passed by Congress."6 The Court's 
interpretation of the act was based on a determination that section 3077 controls 
the application of sections 305 and 308. The conBicting language of coverage 
in section 305, which indicates that persons who merely expend money are 
included in its provisions, was eliminated by holding that a "person" must have 
solicited, collected or received contributions for the purposes designated by 
section 307 of the act. The phrases "principal purpose" and "to be used princi-
pally to aid," found in section 307, were extensively interpreted to mean that a 
substantial part of the purpose of the contribution or of the person soliciting, 
collecting or receiving them was all that was required to bring the person within 
the act. To describe the activities regulated by the act, the Court referred to 
the definition of lobbying found in United States. v. Rumely,8 thus arbitrarily 
restricting the covered activities to those utilizing direct communication with 
members of Congress by means of personal contacts or artificially stimulated 
letter campaigns. The language of section 307(b), "to influence, directly or 
indirectly, the passage or defeat of any legislation," was altered by giving no 
effect to part of its contents, "to influence . . . indirectly." Thus interpreted, 
the act specifies three prerequisites to coverage under section 307: "(l) the 
'person' must have solicited, collected, or received contributions; (2) ... one of 
the main purposes of such contributions, must have been to influence the passage 
or defeat of legislation by Congress; (3) the intended method of accomplishing 
this purpose must have been through direct communication with members of 
Congress."9 Its scope was thus limited to provide a reasonably sufficient guide 
to the actions of an individual and to adjudication by the Court, tli.e two criteria 
to be applied to a criminal statute when its language is questioned as vague and 
indefinite.10 Vagueness as a violation of due process is an ambiguous doctrine 
at best. Some of the factors which are used to find language sufficiently definite 
can be identified, i.e., meanings derived from the common law, through common 
usage, or from previous judicial and administrative interpretations,11 the re-
penalty of line and imprisonment defined in §310(a), the Court found no obstacle to 
separation. 
6 Principal case at 633, Justice Jackson dissenting. 
7 This section defuies a person to whom the act is applicable as one who himself or 
by agent, employee or other person, "directly or indirectly, solicits, collects, or receives 
money or any other thing of value to be used principally to aid, or the principal purpose of 
which person is to aid, in the accomplishment of any of the following purposes: (a) The 
passage or defeat of any legislation by the Congress of the United States. (b) To inHuence, 
directly or indirectly, the passage or defeat of any legislation by the Congress of the United 
States." 
s 345 U.S. 41, 73 S.Ct. 543 (1953). 
9 Principal case at 623. 
10 See 62 HARv. L. REv. 77 (1948). 
llLanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S.Ct. 618 (1939); Champlin Refining 
Co. v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210, 52 S.Ct. 559 (1932). 
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quirement of willfulness or a moral wrong,12 or application to a specific group 
which can properly interpret the language.18 None of these offer a definitive 
answer, however, and they fail to reconcile the many decisions which interpret 
the vagueness criterion.14 Recent opinions indicate a desire to affirm question-
able language when it appears that the legislature has made a realistic effort to 
legislate in a difficult field where any regulatory provisions must necessarily be 
somewhat indefinite.15 Whether the Court should indulge in consideration of 
social and political policy i:o this extent is debatable, particularly when, as in 
the principal case, the interpretation changes the language of the statute so as 
to provide inadequate notice for the individuals who were convicted for acting 
contrary to its provisions. Furthermore, a statute is violative of the First Amend-
ment when its language, on its face, is so vague and indefinite that it can be 
construed to be contrary to the guaranties of free speech and petition of the gov-
ernment.16 This requirement of definite and precise language is more stringent 
than the due process prohibition of vagueness.17 The interpretation in the 
principal case of the act's more important sections would indicate that the Court 
recognized its failure to adhere to this standard. Moreover, in the future the 
individual must predict the applicability of the act from judicial opinion rather 
than from the provisions of the statute. Since the Constitution offers no protec-
tion from retroactive changes in decisional law, the vague language of this stat-
ute is a deterrent to the exercise of the right of free speech.18 Congress admit-
tedly has the power to require lobbyist registration, and the information obtained 
thereby is valuable to Congress and the public. The decision in the principal 
case has salvaged from the act some regulatory measures with which to require 
this registration. Whether the interpretation of this act leaves an efficient 
method of enforcing registration, especially in view of the exclusion from the 
act's coverage those who only expend money for lobbying purposes, remains to 
be established. Should this regulation be satisfactory for its purpose, it is none-
theless questionable that the Court should have so extensively rewritten the act. 
Arne Hovdesven 
12 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 65 S.Ct. 1031 (1945); Jordan v. De George, 
341 U.S. 223, 71 S.Ct. 703 (1951). 
13 Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 38 S.Ct. 323 (1918). 
14 See 53 Mi:cH. L. REv. 264 (1954), for a detailed discussion of the various factors 
which are applicable to the vagueness doctrine. 
15 United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 1538 (1947). See also the dissenting 
opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 665 (1948). 
16 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736 (1940); Stromberg v. California, 
283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532 (1931). 
17Winters v. New York, note 15 supra. 
18 Principal case at 635, Justice Jackson dissenting. 
